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Abstract: 
This paper aims at providing an analytical examination of the criticism that the WTO is unfair and 
hurts the weak, developing countries. We utilize a formal model with the following features: in 
both the powerful and weak economies, pressure groups lobby to influence their trade policies in 
their respective countries. We then allow the powerful country the exclusive ability to spend 
resources to facilitate the lobbying of one of the lobby groups in the weak country, thereby 
moving the trade policy of the developing country in favor of the powerful trading partner. Next we 
compare the effects of such asymmetric foreign influence in a world with no WTO and no 
multilateral principles (most-favored-nation principle MFN and the negotiation principle of 
reciprocity) to a situation with WTO and its associated nondiscrimination principles. We show that 
the weak, developing country will have less "unfair" concessions of market openings and in 
general will be better off with the WTO and with rules of nondiscrimination. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
   As the Doha Round trade talks floundered, there have been increasing 
criticisms of the behavior of the rich and powerful countries during the 
numerous series of negotiations.  Several influential countries were accused 
of trying to manipulate other weaker contracting parties to go along with 
their proposals.1  According to ActionAid,  "Threats, deception and 
manipulation are the underhand negotiation tactics used  by rich countries 
such as the EU and US in the current round of global trade talks" 
 (ActionAid 2006).  
  There are also increasing concerns by some developing countries that 
due to the asymmetric economic, political and diplomatic powers between 
the powerful parties and the relatively powerless members, the world trading 
system as coordinated and implemented by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is fundamentally unfair.   
 "The problem is that the world trade is unfair, and the WTO rules are 
part of the  problem." (Duncan Cameron, Progressive Economics Forum 
2007).  
 Out of frustrations, some analysts and researchers even suggest that 
developing countries may actually be better off without the WTO:   
                                                 
1 The United States and the European Union were accused of not cutting sufficiently their agricultural 
subsidies.  India was seen by some to be leading the G-20 into an obstructionist stance that derailed the 
process. 
 “In short, appealing as the idea of some kind of multilateral trade 
system might be  in principle, it seems clear that the WTO as it currently 
operates does not  constitute such a system. Far from setting fair trade rules 
to protect the interests of  the weak, the WTO has been complicit in 
reinforcing the interests of the strong:  Anarchy – the threat (real or 
supposed) used to justify the WTO – may be bad for  the weak, but the 
tyranny of the strong may be worse.” (Pp. 302-304, Jawra and  Kwa 2003) .  
 These views are often reinforced by pronouncements by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in developed as well as in developing 
economies that the WTO and the Doha Round negotiations facilitate a global 
trading system that exploits the poor, particularly the poor in the relatively 
weak economies.  According to Oxfam,  
 "For trade to work for global development, rich countries needed to 
cut heavily  into the most harmful agricultural subsidies.  They didn't.  They 
needed to give  better access to their markets to developing countries.  
They didn't. And while  offering nothing, rich countries were unfairly 
demanding that developing  countries open up their markets in a way 
that could be very damaging to  development." (Oxfam, New Zealand, 
undated). 
 While the focuses of the barrage of criticisms of the global trading 
system from NGOs and from the developing countries are often very diverse, 
ranging from unfairness and exploitations to issues concerning the 
environment, labor and human rights, one common theme is that the WTO 
as an organization that mediates the global multilateral trading system is 
increasingly acting as a forum used by the rich and powerful to exploit and 
harm the poor and the weaker members. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical examination of this 
line of criticism.  We will utilize a formal model with the following features: 
in both the powerful and the weak economies,  pressure groups lobby to 
influence their trade policies in their respective countries.  We then allow the 
powerful  country the exclusive ability to spend resources to facilitate the 
lobbying of one of the pressure groups in the weak country, thereby moving 
the trade policy of the developing country in favor of the powerful trading 
partner. This feature of asymmetric foreign influence defines the difference 
between the "powerful" and the 'weak" in our model.  Next we compare the 
effects of asymmetric foreign influence in a world with no WTO and no 
multilateral principles (most-favored-nation principle MFN and the 
negotiation principle of reciprocity) to a situation with WTO and its 
associated non-discrimination principles. We show that the weak, 
developing country will have less "unfair" concessions of market openings 
and in general will be better off with the WTO and with rules of 
nondiscrimination.  
 Our analytical approach is essentially a hybrid model combining a 
variant of the Grossman-Helpman protection-for-sale framework (1994) and 
the more recent foreign influence approach by Antras and Miquel (2008). 
Our paper differs from both sets of literature since in the literature related to 
the Grossman-Helpman framework, there is generally no modeling of foreign 
influence, while in Antras and Miquel (2008), there are probabilistic voters 
but no pressure groups. As mentioned before, we want to take the criticisms 
of the WTO seriously and utilize the asymmetric foreign influence feature to 
analytically portrait the difference between the rich, powerful country and 
the weak, developing economy.  We make use of the lobby groups in our 
paper because we believe that the protection-for-sale approach is compatible 
with a wide varieties of governments, including governments with no 
democratic elections.  
 One conclusion that comes out of our examination is that the strong 
(developed) country will always have an incentive to try to "manipulate" the 
weak (developing) country.  But precisely because the strong will always 
want to expend resources to "exploit" the weak that it is in the interest of the 
developing countries to constrain the powerful members with principles of 
nondiscrimination (such as the most-favored-nation principle) as embodied 
by the WTO.2
    In essence, we will state in a particular formal framework an often 
heard defense of the GATT/WTO global trading system : since the WTO is an 
organization that is based on the rule of law with fundamental 
                                                 
2 We will also show in a later section that the principle of reciprocity as  practiced in WTO-related trade 
negotiations  will also be useful to constrain powerful countries. 
nondiscrimination provisions such as MFN and national treatment, the 
institution is explicitly designed to protect the weak and the relatively 
powerless.  Granted, even within the WTO framework, the economically and 
politically weak developing countries will still face great obstacles since their 
capacity to fully utilize the WTO system is limited.  This can be due to 
limited resources or limited expertise, but clearly a rule-based system based 
on non-discrimination is better than without a system or without an 
institution that embodies multilateralism and the spirit of the WTO.   
As we pointed out above, the essential points that we are making here 
are not new.  Many major scholars of the GATT and WTO systems (e.g. 
Bhagwati 1991, Bhagwati and Panagaria 2005, Deardorff, Stern and Whalley 
2008, Baldwin 1990, Krueger 1998, Bagwell and Staiger 1999, Finger and 
Olechowski 1990, Jackson 1992, Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, etc. ) have all 
expressed this line of arguments before.  As a specific example, Jackson 
(1992, p. 85) states that the GATT system can be seen as evolving towards a 
rule-based system:  
 
"One way....is to compare two techniques of modern diplomacy: a 
"rule-oriented" technique and a "power-oriented" technique.....In broad 
perspective one can roughly divide the various techniques for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes into two types: settlement by negotiation 
and agreement with reference (explicitly or implicitly) to relative power 
status of the parties, or settlement by negotiation or  decision with reference 
to norms or rules to which both parties have previously agreed." 
The contributions of this paper will be twofold: one, we extend the 
literature by providing a model that features both lobby groups as well as 
foreign influences. Second, we use an appropriate and well-accepted formal 
framework and derive from the model certain conclusions that are quite 
compatible with the mainstream view that the WTO/GATT trading system is 
designed not to exploit the weak members, but instead to protect them.  
 In the next section, we will provide the basic model in which we have 
a powerful country which can manipulate the weak one.  In Antras and 
Miquel (2008), the probabilistic voters will decide which political party will 
win and what economic policies will be implemented.  In contrast, in this 
paper we  feature pressure groups in both the powerful and weak economies 
and let these groups lobby for the implementation of trade policies.   In 
section 3, we extend the model to incorporate the feature that the rich, 
powerful country can expend resources to influence the pressure groups in 
the weak country, thereby indirectly manipulating the economic and trade 
policies in the developing economy. We examine the effects of such 
manipulations under two conditions: with MFN and without. We show that 
the powerful economies will generally have less incentive to manipulate and 
the welfare of the developing country generally improves with MFN.  We 
then consider the case where foreign manipulation takes place with the 
WTO-related negotiation requirement of reciprocity. In the last section we 
conclude. 
 
2. The Basic Lobbying Model Without Foreign Influence 
 In this section, we present the basic model without the feature of 
foreign influences. Since in our paper, the only difference between the 
"powerful" and "weak" trading partners is the ability of the powerful to 
influence the weak, the two countries will not look analytically different until 
the next section, when we allow foreign influences.  
 To start with, we have two countries, one rich and powerful and the 
other one is developing and weak.   The basic model will be a variant of the 
lobbying model as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Fung, Lin and 
Chang (2007).  However, on top of the lobbying model is the idea that the 
powerful country can expend resources to influence the policies of the weak 
countries.  In Antras and Miquel (2008), the model of foreign influence is 
focused on a probabilistic voter model with electoral competition.  Here we 
use a model without explicitly focused on elections.  We adopt the lobbying 
model precisely because in many developing countries, democratic elections 
may or may not be present.  While many major developing countries do have 
competition for elections (e.g. India and Brazil), some important ones do not 
(e.g. China and Vietnam).  In fact, Branstetter  and Feenstra (2002) explicitly 
use a reduced form model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) to empirically 
study the case of China. While our situation is not focused on China or 
Vietnam alone, we do think that a variant of the Grossman-Helpman model 
is more flexible and can be applied to all forms of political governance 
(democratic or not) in developing countries.  For consistency, we also use a 
pressure group approach to describe the interactions of the government and 
the private sector in the powerful, developed economy. 
 We provide a generic common structure for both the powerful and 
weak economies, using symbols with * referring to the powerful, rich 
economy and symbols without * referring to the weak, developing economy.3  
The common model for both economies is an open economy with two 
sectors: one formal sector and one informal sector.  The formal sector 
consists of two firms: the exporting firm produces good x* (x) for the rich 
(developing) country and the import-competing firm produces good y* (y) for 
the domestic market.  The informal sector in the rich (developing) economy 
produces the numeraire good n*(n) with a mobile factor only.  The goods, 
x*(x)  and y* (y) are produced with the mobile factor and the specific factor 
k* (k).  The mobile factor is supplied inelastically to each respective 
economy.  As long as the informal sector is active, the constant marginal 
product of the mobile factor fixes its economy-wide return to unity. 
 Total population in the economy is normalized to one.  A fraction α*x* 
(αx ) of the population in the powerful (developing) economy owns the 
                                                 
3 The basic model here is similar in structure to Rama and Tabellini  (1999) and Fung, Lin and Chang 
(2009). 
specific factor kx* (kx)  used in the production of good x* (x) and has a direct 
ownership stake in the exporting firm.  A fraction α*y* (αy )  of the population 
owns the specific factor k*y* (ky) and has a direct ownership stake in the 
import-competing firm.  The remaining 1-  α*x*- α*y* ( 1-  αx- αy ) equals  α*m* 
(αm), who are the owners of the mobile factor. The mobile factor is used in 
both the formal and informal sectors and they earn a fixed return of one.  The 
owners of the mobile factor are assumed to be inactive politically.  Owners of 
the specific factor organize as pressure groups for political activity. 
 To model the notion of "market access", we adopt the idea that 
economic profits are related to domestic market shares and output.  This 
leads us to choose the characterization of the exporting and import-
competing industries as global industries that are imperfectly competitive 
and they generate economic profits. Thus, the behavior of the firms in the 
formal sector is an international quantity Nash duopoly.   We adopt this 
market structure partly because it allows us to model more closely the 
concept of "market access" used by many critics of the WTO.  Our analytical 
depiction of market access allows exporting firms to gain market shares and 
economic profits. We are hoping this way of modeling will give the 
arguments of the WTO critics a fair and strong representation.  
 There are two additional reasons why we choose to utilize this form of 
market structure.  First, since developing economies often have weaker 
institutions, including possibly weaker laws against monopolies, it is more 
likely that their markets may be more realistically characterized by imperfect 
competition.  Second, given that developing countries tend to be "small" 
countries, their motives to negotiate tariff reductions due to the terms-of-
trade effects will be less likely.  For all these complementary motivations, we 
model the exporting and import-competing firms for both economies as 
Cournot-Nash competitors. 
 The exporting firm from the rich economy export  x* to the developing 
economy and competes with x.  The profit function of the exporting firm 
from the rich country and the profit function for the import-competing firm 
in the developing country are given by: 
 Л*x* (x*, x, τ) = x*Px (x + x*) - c*x* (w*, x*) - τ x  (1) 
 Лx  (x*, x) = xPx  (x + x*) - cx (w, x)    (2) 
where cx and c*x* are the cost functions for the exporting firm from the rich 
country and the import-competing firm in the developing economy, τ is the 
specific tariff imposed by the developing country against the exporter in the 
rich country. It is clear that given the assumptions of the model,  Л*x* (x*CN, 
xCN,  τ = τ ^ >0) < Л*x* (x*CN, xCN, τ = 0), where x*CN and  xCN are the 
equilibrium Cournot-Nash outputs.  In this model, more market access for 
the exporter (a lower tariff τ imposed on the exporting firm from the rich 
country) means higher profits for the exporter.4
                                                 
4 A lower tariff allows the exporter from the rich country to increase its profits and outputs.  This are the 
standard results with international Cournot-Nash firms. 
 The import-competing firm in the rich economy produces good y* and 
competes with the export y from the developing economy, with the 
respective profit functions being: 
 Л*y* (y*, y) = y*Py (y + y*) - c*y* (w*, y*)   (3)   
 Лy (y*, y) = yPy (y + y*) - cy (w, y) - τ *y   (4) 
cy and cy* are the respective cost functions and τ* is the specific tariff 
imposed on the exports from the weak country. Again given the assumptions 
of the model,  Л*y* (y*CN, yCN, τ* = τ* ^ >0 ) >Л*y* (y*CN, yCN, τ*= 0), where 
y*CN and  yCN are the respective equilibrium Cournot-Nash domestic 
production and imports in the powerful country. Restricting market access 
by the rich country raises profits and output for the import-competing firm in 
the rich economy.  
  
 Turning to the demand side, all individuals in the rich country and the 
developing country have the same preferences respectively and maximize 
the utility functions: 
 U*i*  (n*, Y*c*) = n*i*+ u*(Y*c*i*)     (5) 
  Ui  (n, Xc) = ni + u(Xci)      (6) 
where i*= x*, y* and m* i = x, y and m represent the respective shareholders 
of the export-competing firm, the import-competing firm, and the owners of 
the mobile factor in the rich and developing countries; n*i*and  ni  are the 
respective consumptions of the numeraire good; Y*c*i* =y*c*i* +  yc*i* and  
Xci =x*ci +  xci are the consumptions of the imported goods and the 
domestically produced import-competing goods in each country by 
individual i* and i, respectively.  The functions  U*i*  and Ui  are differentiable, 
increasing and strictly concave in all their arguments.  Utility is maximized 
subjected to the budget constraint: 
 I*i* ≥ n*i* + PyY*c*i*       (7) 
 Ii ≥ ni + PxXci        (8) 
where  I*i* and Ii are the net incomes of the individuals i* and i, Py and Px are 
the domestic prices of y and x.  From equations (5), (6), (7) and (8), the 
indirect utility functions of each individual in groups i* and i have the forms: 
 ψ*i* = I*i* + u *(Y*c*i*) - Py Y*c*i* = Ii + ς*(Py)   (9) 
 ψi = Ii + u (Yci) - Py Yci = Ii + ς (Px)     (10) 
where i* = x*, y*, m* and i = x, y, m, ς* and ς are consumer surplus derived 
from the consumption of the good in the import-competing sector in each 
country.  We assume for convenience that the exportable goods are not 
consumed domestically.5
 The gross indirect utility functions for each individual in each pressure 
group in each country will be: 
 ψ*x* = Л*x*/ α*x* + (τ *y)/( α*x*+  α*y* ) + ς*  
 ψ*y* = Л*y*/ α*y* +(τ *y)/( α*x*+  α*y* ) + ς* 
 ψ*m* = I*m*/ α*m* + ς*       (11) 
                                                 
5 This assumption is made for expositional convenience only.  It will not affect our central results and 
illustrations in the model. 
 ψx = Лx/ αx + (τ x*)/( αx+  αy ) + ς 
 ψy = Лy/ αy + (τ x*)/( αx+  αy ) +ς 
 ψm = Im/ αm + ς 
where Л*x*, Л*y*, Лx and Лy are described in (1)-(4); I*m* and Im are the fixed 
returns to the mobile factors in each country, τ *y and  τ x* are the  
respective tariff revenues in the powerful and weak economies. We assume 
that only the politically organized members get to share the tariff revenues. 
These indirect utility functions identify the utility levels of each individual in 
each group when there is no lobbying. 
 With no pressure group activities the governments choose the 
appropriate levels of τ and τ* to maximize social welfares: 
 Maxτ*  ψ*G*= α*x* ψ*x*+ α*y* ψ*y*+ α*m* ψ*m   (12) 
 Maxτ  ψG= αx ψx+ αy ψy+ αm ψm     (13) 
where ψ*G* and ψG are the social welfare levels which can be attained in the 
absence of any pressure group activities.  The socially optimal trade 
protection levels are given by τ*G*= arg max ψ*G* and τG= arg max ψ*G*. 
 The two pressure groups act as bidders and offer various contribution 
or “bribe” schedules corresponding to different protection levels at the first  
stage.  The policymakers in each country act as auctioneers and set the 
protection levels by maximizing a weighted sum of contributions and 
aggregate social welfare at the second stage.  An equilibrium is a set of 
contribution or bribe schedules and the politically determined protection 
levels.  The structure so far resembles those in Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), Rama and Tabellini (1999), Fung, Lin and Chang (2007). 
 The equilibrium bribery or contribution schedules imply that the 
pressure groups make contributions up to the point where the marginal 
benefit from the resulting change in the trade barriers equal to the marginal 
contribution costs.  Each pressure group in the powerful country provides  
η*i*τ* (τ *)/ (εi*) but we assume that only a fraction of the original amount η*i*τ* 
(τ *) reaches to the politicians.    
 With 0<εi*<1 ,  εi*  acts much like the iceberg "transport" cost.  Here 
we interpret the cost not as transport cost but as organization costs 
associated with lobbying. For example, to faciliate lobbying activities, certain 
consultants, lawyers, advisers or people who are connected to the politician 
in power may need to be paid.  These expenses will not end up directly in 
the hands of the politicians. Similarly we have the contribution schedules  ηiτ 
(τ )/ (εi) for the developing country. As we will highlight further below, we 
will use  εi  as an index of foreign influence. In equilibrium, the contribution 
schedules of each pressure group in each country are given by: 
  α*i* ψ*i* τ*  = η*i*τ* (τ *)/ εi*       (14) 
 αi ψi τ  = ηi τ (τ ) / εi        (15) 
        
where i* =x*, y* and i =x, y; η*i* τ* (τ *)/ εi*  and ηi τ (τ )/ εi are the marginal 
contribution costs provided by pressure groups i* and i in the powerful and 
weak countries, respectively. 6  
 Without any foreign influence, the objectives of the governments are 
to maximize their own possibilities of remaining in power.  Following 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the governments maximize 
the weighted sums of the total levels of political contributions or bribes and 
the general national welfares: 
 Max τ * Ω* = γ* [η*x* (τ *) + η*y* (τ *)] +  ψ*G*    (16) 
 Max τ  Ω = γ [ηx (τ ) + ηy (τ )] +  ψG     (17) 
where  γ* >0 and γ >0 are the respective weights attached by the powerful 
country and the developing country on the contributions from the pressure 
groups,  Ω* and  Ω are the respective objective functions of the policymakers.  
Maximizations of (16) and (17) and using (14) and (15) yield: 
 [1+ γ*εx*](α*x* ψ*x* τ*)+[1+ γ*εy*](α*y* ψ*y* τ*)+α*m* ψ*m* τ* =0   (18) 
 [1+ γεx](αx ψx τ) + [1+ γεy](αy ψy τ)+ αm ψm τ* =0                              (19) 
Since we have γ*>0, γ*>0, εx*>0 and εx>0, the political-motivated 
policymakers place more weights on the pressure groups that contribute to 
the respective governments, while the group that is not organized politically 
has its interests represented only by the share of its population α*m* and αm .  
The additional weights attached to the contributing groups consist of two 
                                                 
6 To ensure that these shcedules are truthful, a sufficient condition is for the schedules to be differentiable 
around the neighborhood of the equilibrium. 
parts: one is the weight politicians attach to the contributions γ* and γ and 
the other is the organizational costs for lobbying  εx* and εx. 
 Equations (18) and (19) implicitly define the politically-determined 
tariffs in each country as τ*ρ* and τρ.  In particular, τρ is a function of εx and εy 
and τ*ρ* is a function of ε*x* and ε*y*.  Without knowing the specific values of 
εx , εy , ε*x* and ε*y*, we cannot determine apriori if the politically-determined 
tariffs will be higher than the tariffs that maximize national welfare.  
However, if these organization costs are equal for both lobby groups in each 
country, then we can show that  τ*ρ* > τ*G*and τρ > τG, i.e. the politically-
determined tariffs are higher than the welfare-maximizing tariffs.7
Furthermore, because of such excessive trade protections, national welfares 
are lower in the presence of pressure groups.  The above model is a basically 
a variant of the well-accepted Grossman-Helpman lobby group model 
applying to two separate countries. 
 
3. The Extended Model with Asymmetric Foreign Influence 
 In the previous section, we present the basic political-economy model 
of tariffs in a two-country setting.  We now introduce the feature of foreign 
influence.  In particular, we assume that these two countries have 
asymmetric power.  The rich, powerful country is able to help finance 
                                                 
7 A derivation of these results with no organization costs are given in Fung, Lin and Chang (2007).  With 
given organization costs, the results are qualitatively similar. 
lobbyists or pressure group operaing in the developing economy,  while the 
poor country is too weak to influence the powerful member.   
 In the weak economy, the lobby group that would like to see lower 
tariffs is the exporting firm. To incorporate the feature of foreign influence in 
our model, we assume that the powerful economy can raise resources to 
increase εx, which enables the exporter in the weak economy to be more 
effective in lobbying for a lower trade barrier. Alternatively, we can also 
allow the powerful economy to lower εy and reduce the effectiveness of the 
import-competing firm to pressure the government in the weak country. 
Since the results are qualitatively the same, we will just focus on the case 
where εx is manipulated. 
  We have many real-life examples of one foreign country trying to 
influence the policy outcome of another country.  For example, there are 
ongoing debates among policymakers in the European Union concerning the 
type and extent of regulations needed on the matter of sharing data and 
information on the internet, the so-called net neutrality debates.  Lobby 
groups from the United States have been spending a lot of time and 
resources to influence the European Parliament about this policy, since they 
believe that the policy outcome in Europe can have major effects on the 
same debate in the United States (Kevin O'brien 2009).  The type of lobbying 
activities include organizing forums ,meetings and debates  between the 
lobby groups, the European media and the European legislators.  Lobbyists 
also try to provide information and their arguments directly to legislators. 
Acoording to a report by International Herald Tribune, "Lobbying by U.S. 
businesses in Brussels is not unusual. More than 30 U.S. companies like 
Pfizer, Microsoft, McDonald's, Philip Morris, Westinghouse and Kraft Foods 
employ lobbyists in Brussels, according to the European Parliament. Foreign 
countries and businesses also hire lobbyists to work in Washington. But most 
of the time, lobbying by foreign entities tends to be discreet ."  (Kevin 
O'brouke 2009).   
 Given that we are focusing on an asymmetric relationship between a 
rich and powerful economy and a weak, developing country, we will assume 
that only the powerful economy can influence the poor economy, but not 
vice versa.  For the rich country, we now assume that it can expend 
resources to reduce the organization costs of one of the lobby groups.  The 
objective function becomes: 
 ΩI* = γ* [η*x* (τ *) + η*y* (τ *)] +  ψ*G*- 1/2(εx/σ)2   (20) 
with ΩI* being the objective function in the powerful economy when foreign 
influence is allowed. We follow Antras and Miquel (2008) and assume that 
there are quadratic costs associated with foreign influence activities, with σ 
being the parameter that measures how effective the powerful country is in 
reducing the organizional costs abroad.  We focus on the situation where the 
the government in the rich country gets directly involved in manipulating the 
pressure group abroad.8  In addition to choosing its own tariff, the powerful 
country chooses εx so that: 
 ψ*G* εx - εx/σ = 0       (21) 
This reduces to:  
 Л*x*τ [ə τ/ ə εx] - εx/σ = 0      (22) 
The first term measures the benefits of foreign influence to the rich country.  
By raising εx and reducing the effective lobbying costs of the exporter in the 
poor country, it leads to more concessions of market access to the rich 
country's exporting firm, raising its economic profits.  The second term 
measures the marginal cost of providing foreign influence.  We can use σ as 
an index of how powerful the rich country is in influencing the weak 
economy.  With a high  σ, the marginal cost of facilitating the lobby group 
which has a similar preference as the powerful member is low.  This leads to 
a lower amount of lobbying organization costs and more market access by 
the developing country.  In short, the powerful country can use resources to 
induce and empower the local group that is friendly to its preferences and 
the power of such "manipulation" can be measured by σ.    
                                                 
8 As highlighted in Antras and Miquel (2008) and by O'brien (2009), this can be achieved openly or 
covertly.  Covert activities include activities by the intelligence agency (such as the CIA), efforts and 
expenses by diplomatic agencies (such as the representatives to the United Nation and the State 
Department)  or by the use of foreign aid. 
 Suppose we consider the case where σ is very large so that the rich 
country is extremely powerly.  It can easily be shown that with a sufficiently 
large σ, the foreign-influenced tariff (τI) and the foreign -influenced national 
welfare (ψI) of the weak economy will have the following characteristics:  τI < 
τG< τρ,  and ψI < ψG<ψρ .  In other words, under strong foreign influence, tariff 
level will be smaller than the optimal level and national welfare will also be 
smaller than the optimal level.9   
 The above analysis is for the case of no WTO and no MFN, a case 
which Bhagwati (1991) and Bhagwati and Panagaria (2005) refers to as the 
"law of the jungle". In a world with no WTO, the powerful country 
unilaterally chooses the right amount of influence for itself and maximizes its 
own welfare without constraints accordingly.   
 How would the results be different with MFN?  Since the concessions 
of market access will have to be shared by all other members of the WTO, 
the marginal benefits of using resources to manipulate the weak country will 
be reduced.  In other words,  the first term of (22) is now smaller, leading to 
a larger τI.  Since without the MFN, we are in the range of tariffs between free 
trade and the optimal tariff, smaller concessions of market access leads to an 
                                                 
9 This can be seen as follows: the national welfare function in the developing country is just the sum of 
profits, consumer surpluses and tariff revenue.  It is monotonically increasing from free trade to the optimal 
tariff  τG. After τG, the national welfare function is monotonically decreasing, until it reaches the 
prohibitive tariff.  With a sufficiently large σ, the tariff in the weak economy is pushed to below the optimal 
level.  In that case, the national welfare of the developing country is lower.   
improvement of national welfare for the developing country.  We now have 
two results: 
Proposition 1. The rich, powerful country that is self-interested will always 
have an incentive to exert influence on the weak, developing economy, with 
or without the WTO.  Without the principle of MFN, the rich country will 
influence the developing country to open up its market even more than 
under MFN. 
Proposition 2. The weak, developing country is better off under MFN if the 
rich country is sufficiently powerful 
Proposition 1 holds regradless of how powerful the rich country is.  This 
highlights the fact that the more influential country will always have an 
incentive to influence the trade policy of the weaker country, given that 
more market access means higher profits for the exporting sector in the 
developed economy.  The proper benchmark to evaluate the WTO and its 
associated core principle of MFN is not an ideal, utopian world in which self-
interested nations will not act to influence others.  Rather the question 
should be whether WTO will still improve the welfare of the weak, given that 
we will always have asymmetric power.  This leads us back to the familiar 
but important argument in defense of the multilateral system, an argument 
clearly explained by many prominent scholars of the GATT/WTO system:  
will the weak countries be better off with a "power-based" system or a "rule-
based system"?  The answer (at least in the case most feared by the weaker 
parties and most often pointed out by critics of the WTO) is that in the face 
of great unequal power, the national welfare of the developing countries is 
greater with MFN than without MFN. 
 How would the analysis be different if the countries operate within the 
WTO norm of reciprocity?  If we impose reciprocity, concessions of market 
openings by the developing country should be matched by a reduction of 
tariffs in the powerful country, leading to an erosion of profits of the import-
competing firm in the rich economy.  The choice of the extent of influence 
will be implicitly defined by the revised first order condition, taking into 
account reciprocity: 
 Л*x*τ [ə τ/ ə εx] - εx/σ- Л*y*τ* [ə τ*/ ə τ ] [ə τ/ ə εx]   = 0  (23) 
where [ə τ*/ ə τ ] refers to the reciprocal reduction of tariffs and Л*y*τ* refers to 
the negative impact or market access on the profits of the import-competing 
firm in the rich economy.  Comparing (22) and (23), it is clear that 
reciprocity reduces the amount of influence by the powerful economy, 
resulting in less concessions by the developing country and for the case of a 
very strong powerful country, better economic welfare. 
Proposition 3.  With reciprocity, the weak, developing country will be less 
influenced to give market access concessions. With a sufficiently powerful 
rich country, the developing country is better off with reciprocity 
Proposition 3 states that in a power-based approach (without the WTO and 
without reciprocity), the weak is under the uncontrained influence of the 
powerful.  With reciprocity and the WTO, the strong country will still try to 
exert pressure on the weak, but it is restrained not to go full force because it 
now has to reciprocate the concessions it extracts from the developing 
country. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we aim to evaluate analytically some of the criticisms 
levied on the current world trading system in general, and the WTO with its 
affilaited core principles of MFN and reciprocity in particular.  We construct 
a model that builds on the pressure group approach of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) and the foreign influence approach of Antras and Miquel 
(2008).  We also try to be fair and do justice to the critics' notion of market 
opening concessions by adopting a market structure which ties higher 
economic profits to a larger market share. 
 We show in this framework that the strong country will always have 
an incentive to exert influence on the weak, developing country.  This will 
indeed, as the critics of the WTO contend, lead to more market concessions 
and a lowering of profits by the import-competing firm in the poor country.  
However, contrary to the arguments of the critics, we show that in the 
presence of foreign influence, the WTO with its principles of MFN and 
reciprocity will actually reduce concessions and increase national welfare of 
the developing country. 
 The contributions of this paper is to utlilize an appropriate, well-
accepted combination of formal approaches to shed light on the impact of 
the WTO in the presence of asymmetric power and influence..  By taking 
some of the views of the critics seriously, we actually end up reinforcing a 
line of argument that has been made forcefully and eloquently by many 
prominent scholars of the GATT/WTO system: the WTO system with its 
principles of nondiscrimination is a rule-based approach designed not to 
exploit, but to protect the weak, precisely because in the real world we have 
asymmetric power between the rich and the developed countries.  The 
powerful country will always have an incentive to exert pressure on the poor 
with or without the WTO, but the developing countries will be better off with 
the WTO since its nondiscrimination principles help to mitigate and temper 
some of these influences. 
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